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Although Europe has experienced unprecedented numbers of refugee arrivals in recent years, thereexists almost no causal evidence regarding the impact of the refugee crisis on natives’ attitudes, policypreferences, and political engagement. We exploit a natural experiment in the Aegean Sea, where
Greek islands close to the Turkish coast experienced a sudden andmassive increase in refugee arrivals, while
similar islands slightly farther away did not. Leveraging a targeted survey of 2,070 island residents and
distance toTurkeyasan instrument,weﬁnd thatdirect exposure to refugeearrivals induces sizableand lasting
increases in natives’ hostility toward refugees, immigrants, and Muslim minorities; support for restrictive
asylumand immigrationpolicies; andpolitical engagement to effect suchexclusionarypolicies. Since refugees
only passed through these islands, our ﬁndings challenge both standard economic and cultural explanations
of anti-immigrant sentiment and show that mere exposure sufﬁces in generating lasting increases in hostility.
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen thehighest levels of forceddisplacement, up to 66 million, since the after-math of World War II. Since 2015, more than
three million individuals, predominantly from Muslim-
majority countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq,
have applied for asylum in Europe alone. Although
applications declined in 2016 and 2017 after the
implementation of the EU–TurkeyAgreement, overall
numbers are expected to remain high as asylum seekers
continue to ﬂee protracted conﬂicts and persecution.
The dramatic increase in asylum seekers and the
chaotic management of refugee ﬂows have dominated
news cycles across Europe, led to social tensions and
political conﬂict, and triggered, at times, even violent
political backlash (Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hang-
artner 2016; Marbach and Ropers 2018). In many
countries, extreme-right parties have sought to leverage
natives’ anxieties to mobilize voters and enact more
restrictive asylum policies. Several recent studies that
focusedonAustria (Steinmayr2018), France (Vertier and
Viskanic 2018), and Greece (Dinas et al. forthcoming)
have all corroborated that refugee migration is an
important factor fueling the rise of extreme-right parties.
Beyond its impact on aggregate vote shares for
extreme-right parties, little is known, however, about
how refugee migration shapes the attitudes, policy
preferences, and political behavior of European citizens.
This lacuna is problematic for our theoretical under-
standing of the short- and long-term consequences of the
refugee crisis on Europe’s political landscape and the
mechanism under which contact with refugees alleviates
or catalyzes concerns. Similarly, policymakers who are
taskedwith designing amore cooperative asylum system
need a deeper understanding of how and when refugee
arrivals trigger local opposition and political backlash
(Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2017).
Why do we know so little about the impact of refugee
migration on natives’ attitudes, preferences, and
behavior? First, in order to go beyond readily available
aggregate data on voting behavior and drill down to
individual-level outcome measures, one has to ﬁeld a
survey in areas with varying levels of refugee exposure.
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Second, akeyproblem facedbyall studiesof the impact of
refugee migration is that refugee ﬂows are far from ran-
domly assigned. StartingwithRavenstein’s (1885) “law of
migration,” scholarshaveexplored themigrant’sdecision-
making process that determines whether—and where
to—migrate, and there is ample evidence that a similar
calculus also applies to forcefully displaced people (e.g.,
Neumayer 2005). Within the ﬁnancial and legal con-
straints thatasylumseekers face, they tend toﬂee toplaces
that are feasible to travel to, but alsowhere they are, inter
alia, welcome. This latent hospitality toward refugees is
hard to measure empirically but will typically confound
the relationship between refugee arrivals and outcome
measures of hostility (measured after the arrivals took
place). Ifone ignores this importantconfounderandrunsa
cross-sectional regression of, say, exclusionary attitudes
on refugee arrivals, the estimated correlation might well
be negative (indicating that more arrivals alleviate hos-
tility), even if the true causal effect is positive.
In this paper, we address both issues by ﬁelding a
targeted survey of European citizens to measure the
impact of the refugee crisis on their attitudes toward
refugees, immigrants, and Muslim minorities; their pref-
erences regarding asylum, immigration, and integration
policies; and their political engagement to enact policies
affecting refugees. By focusing the comparison on similar
respondents in comparable areas, some of whom were
directly exposed to the refugee crisis and someofwhomat
most indirectly so, we can contribute to the ongoing
debate about the consequences of refugee migration and
empirically answer the question whether exposure to the
refugee crisis triggers or alleviates natives’ hostility.
We focus on Greece, one of the European countries
most affectedby the refugee crisis.With its long coastline
along the EU external border, its proximity to the
Turkish coast, and many difﬁcult-to-patrol islands,
Greece quickly became the main entry point to Europe
for most Syrian and Afghan refugees. Figure 1 (left
panel) shows that of the 1.4 million new asylum seekers
who have reachedEuropean territory between 2015 and
2016 by passing the Mediterranean Sea, more than one
million arrived in Greece (UNHCR 2016). Figure 1
(right panel) indicates that in Greece, these arrivals
happened within a very short time window: from a
baseline of almost zero at the beginning of 2015, the
number of monthly arrivals peaked at 211,000 at the
height of the crisis in lateOctober 2015. After theMarch
2016 Agreement between the European Union and
Turkey called for the return of refugees arriving in
Greece from Turkey, effectively closing off this migra-
tion route, arrivals of asylum seekers in Greece imme-
diately decreased to 3,000 per month by the end of 2016.
These boat arrivals not only took place in a short time
window, but were also highly concentrated among
about a dozen Greek islands in the Aegean Sea. While
islands closest to the Turkish coast received up to ﬁve
refugee arrivals per resident between the onset of
the refugee crisis and the implementation of the
EU–Turkey agreement, on islands only slightly farther
away the number was essentially zero. As we discuss
later in detail, we leverage this distance to the Turkish
coast as an instrument for refugee arrivals. This solves
the aforementioned selection issue by focusing the
analysison theexogenouspartof thevariance in refugee
arrivals that is solely driven by proximity to Turkey and
ignoring the endogenous part that is driven by preex-
isting differences in attitudes toward refugees.
Several factors facilitate our empirical strategy. First,
distance to theTurkish coast causes dramatic variation in
thenumberof refugeearrivals.This allowsus tocompare
FIGURE 1. Mediterranean Refugee Arrivals
Note: Right panel shows the number of sea arrivals across countries at the external border of Europe for 2015 (dark blue) and 2016
(light blue). Left panel shows number of monthly refugee arrivals in all of Greece (gray) and on the Aegean islands (dark blue).
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similar residents on neighboring islands, some of which
received hundreds of thousands of passing refugees,
while others slightly farther away receivednone. Second,
geographical proximity and the fact that they often
belong to the same administrative unit ensures that
islands with and without arrivals are identical across
many observable and unobservable characteristics, such
as the nature and quality of political competition and
regional government, provision of public services
(education, healthcare, and the judiciary), and access to
EU funds. Third, among those islands with refugee
arrivals, refugees were concentrated in particular
UNHCR hotspots, allowing us to also leverage within-
island variation as a complementary mechanism test.
We ﬁnd that direct exposure to the refugee crisis has
statistically and politically meaningful effects on natives’
exclusionary attitudes, preferences over asylum and
immigrationpolicies, andpolitical engagement.Exploiting
the exogenous variation in refugee arrivals caused by
distance to the Turkish coast—our instrument—we ﬁnd
that respondents directly exposed to the refugee crisis
experiencea1/4 standarddeviation(SD) increase intheir
anti-asylum seeker and anti-immigrant attitudes as well
as a 1/6 SD increase in their anti-Muslim attitudes.
Comparedtorespondentsonunexposed islands, theyare
more likely to oppose hosting additional asylum seekers
and to support the ban from school for asylum seekers’
children and are less likely to donate to UNHCR and to
sign a petition that lobbies the government to provide
better housing for refugees. Across all these outcomes,
we ﬁnd that direct exposure to the refugee crisis has a
long-term impact on natives’ hostility. In a companion
study,wealsoexamine theshort-termimpactofexposure
to the refugee crisis on voting behavior in this setting
(Dinas et al. forthcoming).
Our study makes four contributions. First, it provides
some of the ﬁrst causal evidence on the impact of the
refugeecrisisonexclusionaryattitudes, policypreferences,
and political engagement of European citizens. Second,
rather than focusing on contemporaneous, and potentially
exacerbated, effects of refugeearrivals, our studyallowsus
to look at the long-term consequences, as we conducted
our survey in February and March 2017. Ever since the
implementation of the March 2016 Agreement between
the European Union and Turkey, refugee ﬂows were
minimal, so that our survey measures the persistence of
past shocks about a year after the crisis. Third, in Greece,
the refugee crisis coincided with economic turmoil and
ﬁnancial austerity imposed by the so-called troika con-
sisting of the European Commission, the European
Central Bank, and the IMF, as well as the chaotic man-
agement of refugee ﬂows at the local, national, and
European level. All these factors are believed to catalyze
anti-immigrant sentiment (Dinas et al. forthcoming).
Fourth, to understand how island residents experi-
enced the refugeecrisis, it is important tonote thatalmost
all refugees left the islands of ﬁrst arrival within a very
short period, typically within twenty-four hours, to
continuetheir journeyviaAthens totheGreekmainland,
and other European countries. The passing presence of
refugees on these islands allows us to make important
inferences about the drivers of anti-refugee sentiment.
On the one hand, the transient nature of arrivals all but
eliminated the chance for sustained interactions between
natives and refugees. For contact to reduce tensions,
scholarshaveproposeda fairlystrict setofconditions that
have to be met, such as friendly acquaintance within a
cooperative context (rather thanaone-off exchangewith
a stranger) (Allport 1954; Pettigrew1998;VanLaar et al.
2005). These conditions were clearly not met in the
present context, and our study therefore identiﬁes the
“pure” effect of exposure to the refugee crisis.Hence,we
have little reason to expect that exposure reduced hos-
tility among the local population.
On the other hand, because refugees quickly left the
islands for other European countries, the usual materi-
alist concerns that immigrants competewith natives over
scarce resources such as jobs or welfare beneﬁts (Bobo
andHutchings 1996; Scheve and Slaughter 2001) do also
not apply in this context. The same is true for ideational
concerns that immigrants change the culture and identity
of the host country (Golder 2003). Based on these
standard theories of the economic and cultural drivers of
anti-immigrant sentiment, we would not expect that
refugee arrivals trigger exclusionary reactions.
Our ﬁnding that hostility prevails in the Greek Aegean
islands suggests that mere exposure to the chaos of the
refugee crisis generates a feeling of threat that can activate
latent predispositions against immigrants and mobilize
support for exclusionary policies (Sniderman, Hagen-
doorn, and Prior 2004). The next section summarizes the
predictions of the most prominent theories of intergroup
contact and conﬂict for the present context. After
describing the survey sample and measures, the main
results, and the mechanism tests, we return to further
exploringthe implicationsofourﬁndingsforourtheoretical
understanding of the drivers of exclusionary reactions.
CONTACT, CONFLICT, AND THREAT IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE GREEK REFUGEE CRISIS
A vast literature has investigated how proximity to and
contact with immigrants and refugees shape the atti-
tudes of natives.While a full review is beyond the scope
of this paper, we focus on the theories and mechanisms
most relevant for the context of the refugee crisis and
refer themorebroadly interested reader to theexcellent
reviews of Paluck and Green (2009) and Hainmueller
and Hopkins (2014).
One stream of research originating from Allport’s
seminal work (1954) assesses how, and under which
conditions, contact between themajority ingroup and an
ethnic outgroup can yield increased levels of empathy
and understanding (Barlow, Louis, and Hewstone 2009;
Berg 2009; Finseraas and Kotsadam 2017; McLaren
2003; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006) and decrease dis-
criminatory behavior (Scacco and Warren 2018). These
studies show that if ingroups and outgroups (i) share
equal status and common goals, (ii) ﬁnd themselves in a
cooperative rather than competitive environment, and
(iii) operate under a well-deﬁned set of norms or regu-
lations, contact can reduce prejudices. And although
Allport (1954) was the ﬁrst to point out that these
Dominik Hangartner et al.
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conditions are often hard to meet in reality, contact
theory seems to be robust to violations of some of these
criteria (Paluck, Green, and Green 2017; Pettigrew and
Tropp 2006). Recent works on the mechanism under-
lying theseeffectspoint totheroleofcontact in increasing
knowledgeabout the outgroup, encouraging perspective
taking, and reducing intergroup anxiety (Barlow et al.
2012; Pettigrew and Tropp 2008).
Proximity, however, does not necessarily lead to
contact. One example that illustrates this distinction
comes from Enos (2014), who randomly assigned
physical proximity to outgroup members by placing
Spanish-speaking confederates on the Boston subway,
without facilitating face-to-face interaction. The result
was an increase in exclusionary attitudes among the
white-majority group. Observational studies that
examine the correlation between the share of immi-
grants and anti-immigrant sentiment have yielded an
ambiguous picture. Whereas some studies suggest that
ethnic diversity is accompanied by lower levels of
intergroup hostility (Sturgis et al. 2014; Zorlu 2017),
others ﬁnd exactly the opposite (Kaufmann and Harris
2015; Putnam2007; Schlueter andScheepers 2010). The
latter results are often interpreted as evidence in favor
of the realistic group conﬂict hypothesis: thepresence of
an outgroup in sufﬁcient numbers generates, according
to this line of argument, competition for scarce
resources (Blalock 1967; Blumer 1958; Bobo 1983;
Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Forbes 1997; Hardin 1997).
Closely related to theoriesof realisticgroupconﬂict isa
rapidly increasing stream of political science research
that studies the drivers of anti-immigrant sentiment.
Numerous explanations have been suggested, yet they
tend to cluster into two broad categories: economic
concerns and cultural concerns (Golder 2003; Hainmu-
eller and Hopkins 2014). Economic concerns can result
fromat least three, complementary, sources. Natives can
perceive that asylum seekers increase competition in the
labormarketand thusenhancetheriskofunemployment
(Mayda 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001); alter the
means-testedwelfare distribution, converting them from
netbeneﬁciaries tonetcontributors(FacchiniandMayda
2009); and lead to congestion effects, deﬁned as the
concern that in the short run, supply of public goods and
services, such as public housing, health, and education,
cannot follow the rapid increase in demand caused by
immigration (Cavaille and Ferwerda 2017).
Cultural concerns refer to a more general tendency to
perceiveoutgroupnormsandvaluesas incompatible and
potentially in conﬂict with those of the majority ingroup
(Brown 2000; Connor 1994). Religious, ethnic, or lin-
guistic differences are often treated as signals of cultural
distance, triggering exclusionary preferences as a way of
protecting the ingroup’s customs and traditions (Bansak,
Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016; Brader, Valentino,
and Suhay 2008; Ivarsﬂaten 2005). Previous research has
found that these cultural or identity concerns are often
more important forexplainingopposition to immigration
in Western countries than economic concerns (see, e.g.,
Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014).
Whatpredictionsdothese theoriesmake inthecontext
of theGreek refugee crisis? The fact that asylum seekers
and refugees quickly passed through the Aegean islands
posits a challenge for the contact hypothesis since the
conditions under which contact can reduce prejudice are
clearly not met in this context. Time for interaction with
the same person wasminimal, and casual contact did not
occur in a cooperative context and happened in the
absence of common norms. Furthermore, the potential
for friendship was limited since the local population was
well aware that refugees are leaving the island with the
next available ferry to Athens.1
But for the very samereason,wewouldalsonot expect
that economic and cultural concerns play a major role in
this context. Refugees did not enter the labor market on
these islandsanddidnotrequestwelfarebeneﬁtsorapply
for public housing. The accommodation costs of the
refugee camps, where a few of the refugees stayed for a
while before continuing their journey, were mostly
shoulderedby the central government and theEuropean
Union. For the same reason, perceptions of threat to
national identity should also be minimal, as it soon
became obvious that virtually all asylum seekers would
quickly leave the islands.Accordingly, standard theories
of cultural and economic concerns would predict that
passingmigrationﬂowsdonot triggera lasting increase in
anti-immigration sentiment.
The massive numbers of refugee arrivals, albeit
transient in nature did, however, clearly disrupt the
daily life and routines of the native island population.
Numerous reports in the local press highlight the
inability of the local and national authorities to effec-
tively provide medical support,2 sanitary services,3 and
waste collection4 for the passing refugees.Mountains of
rubbish and open defecation surrounding arrival and
departure hotspots sparked concerns about the spread
of diseases. Chaotic scenes and the presence of large
number of staff and volunteers from the UNHCR, the
EU, the National Center of Disease Control and Pre-
vention, and various NGOs further compounded these
effects to create the impression of a state of emergency.
In fact, the mayor of Lesvos, Spyros Galinos, asked the
central government to declare a state of emergency akin
to that followingmajor natural disasters.Hewrote in his
(open) letter to the central government: “the whole
1 A fraction, about 11,000of themore thanonemillionasylumseekers
that arrivedon theAegean islands, is still hosted in refugee campson a
few islands. These refugee camps, the largest of which is Lesvos’
Moria, are, however, located in the rural countryside, which severely
limits the potential for interaction. Furthermore, as the robustness
tests in Appendix E9 show, our results are robust to excluding
respondents in the proximity of these camps.
2 See, e.g., the editorial “The State is late but… volunteers and the
municipality are rushing [to respond to the crisis]” (author trans-
lation) in the newspaperEmpros on September 5, 2015. http://www.
emprosnet.gr/koinonia/75136-kratos-argei-alla-ethelontes-kai-
dimos-trehoyn.
3 See, e.g., the editorial “Social Explosion is in sight” (author trans-
lation) in the newspaper Dimokratis on September 3, 2015. www.
dimokratis.gr/index.php?article52015-9-3_orati_i_koinoniki_ekrixi.
4 See, e.g., Marinos Orfanos in the newspaper Empros: “The port [of
Mytilene] has become a vast dumpster bin and a space of open-air
toilets” (author translation) on September 2, 2015. http://www.
emprosnet.gr/koinonia/75750-zamtrakis-aperanti-homateri-kai-horos-
ypaithrion-afodeytirion-limani.
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situationand the inability [of the central administration]
to handle it leaves local communities at the verge of
social explosion […] the non-controlled nature of the
refugee crisis has already turned this problem into a
threat that is proportionate to a large scale natural
disaster […] the rule of law needs to be reinstated […],
public health needs to be safeguarded and the social
order of the island needs to be maintained, and the
migrants need to be treated humanely according to the
provisions of the UN Charter for human rights.”5
The mayor’s letter and the newspaper reports make
clear that this disruption of everyday life was not a mere
nuisance for the local population,butwasperceivedasan
upsetof the socialorderandgenerateda feelingof threat.
Recentworkonsocial threat suggests that theperception
of a threatening environment can activate otherwise
latent predispositions against immigrants and other
minorities (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Hetherington
and Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005). This process can have
two complementary consequences: ﬁrst, the chaos on
arrival islands might act as a situational trigger that
“galvanizes” (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004)
the attitudes of those already predisposed against
immigration.Second, perceived threatandanxietymight
alsomobilize support for exclusionarypoliciesaboveand
beyond those that already hold hostile attitudes (Brader,
Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Sniderman, Hagendoorn,
and Prior 2004). Since perceptions of threat and anxiety
areemotional triggers, theymakeit likely that individuals
will not only change their attitudes or beliefs, but also
take political action (Brader 2006; Brader, Valentino,
and Suhay 2008).
Furthermore, the referenced newspaper articles sug-
gest that perceived levels of social threat were highest in
the vicinity of the arrival and departure hotspots. In the
locations where refugees gathered, the failure of the
Greek government and the European Union in man-
aging the refugee ﬂows was most visible, and their dis-
ruptionofnatives’everyday lifemost severe.Hence, akin
to Hopkins’ (2010) politicized places hypothesis, we
expect toﬁndthestrongest increases inoutgrouphostility
for natives living in close proximity of the hotspots that
experienced the refugee crisis most intensely.
Taken together, these factors suggest that social
threat can explain how the chaotic management of
refugee ﬂows activates exclusionary reactions to
immigrants and ethnic minorities, even in a context
where these ﬂows are temporary and transient. In the
absence of contact, as well as economic or cultural
concerns, the mere exposure to the refugee crisis suf-
ﬁces to crystallize latent anti-immigrant attitudes and
mobilize citizens to support exclusionary policies.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
To estimate the causal effect of exposure to the refugee
crisis on natives’ exclusionary attitudes, policy prefer-
ences, and political engagement, we leverage the
distance of an island to the Turkish coast as an instru-
ment for refugee arrivals. This instrumental variable
approach allows us to resolve the selection bias asso-
ciated with refugees choosing their arrival island based
on preexisting levels of hostility toward outgroups.
As shown inFigure 2, islands very close to theTurkish
coast, such as Samos,Chios, andLesvos, receivedmore
than ﬁve arrivals per island resident within the
14 months between the onset of the crisis in early 2015
and implementation of the EU–Turkey agreement in
March2016.Thenumberof arrivals rapidlydecreases as
the distance to Turkey increases, with islands farther
than 50 kilometer away not registering any refugees.As
indicated by the blue line, the relationship between per
capita refugee arrivals and logged distance can be well
approximated using linear regression. Table D10 in
Appendix provides the estimates from these ﬁrst-stage
regressions of the per capita number of arrivals on
distance and a binary indicator of arrivals on distance,
respectively.Theﬁrst stage for thebinary treatment, our
main speciﬁcation, is very strong (F-statistic5 133.75).
The reason for this becomes clear in Figure 2: while all
but two islands that are less than 50 kilometers away
from Turkey receive refugees, no island more than 50
kilometers away register any arrivals. As robustness
tests, we also estimate the ﬁrst stage using a continuous
measure of the number of arrivals per capita and the log
number of arrivals per capita.6 The corresponding F-
statistics are 9.22 and 14.20, respectively, around the
critical value proposed by Stock and Yogo (2002).
One frequent concern with instrumental variable
analysis is the credibility of the exclusion restriction. In
our context, a violation of the exclusion restriction
would mean that islands slightly farther away from the
Turkish coast not only register fewer refugee arrivals,
but are also different in other, preexisting, character-
istics such as the sociodemographic composition or
political preferences of the local population. For-
tunately, we can conduct a variety of placebo tests that
show that this is not a concern. Table 1 provides the
estimates from two-stage least squares regressions, our
main speciﬁcation further discussed below, of the pla-
cebo outcomes on a binary indicator for refugee
arrivals, instrumented with distance to the Turkish
coast. For all placebo outcomes—vote choice for the
main parties Golden Dawn, Nea Dimokratia, and
PASOK in the January 2015 election (prior to the onset
of the refugee crisis) and thedemographic indicators for
female, old versus young (split at the median age), and
tertiary education—we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effect. Table
D11 inAppendix extends the analysis to smaller parties
that also ran in the January 2015 elections and a linear
speciﬁcation for education and age. None of the esti-
mated coefﬁcients is signiﬁcantly different from zero,
thereby supporting our conﬁdence in the validity of the
instrument.
5 A copy of the letter is available here: https://tinyurl.com/yc4ruefh.
6 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing us to the log-
log speciﬁcation.Hence, this robustness testwasnotprespeciﬁed in the
pre-analysis plan.
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SURVEY
In order to assess the impact of refugee arrivals in the
Aegean Sea, our sampling frame consists of all
inhabited Greek islands. Between February 22 and
March 7, 2017, we successfully interviewed 2,070
respondents, split equally between treated and control
islands and proportional to the population of each
island. All interviews were conducted using computer-
assisted telephone interview (CATI) by calling landline
numbers, which were randomly selected from the tel-
ephoneregistry.7Withineachhousehold, the respondent
was selectedusing the next-birthdaymethod, an efﬁcient
procedure for selecting a sample that is representative of
FIGURE 2. Visualization of the First-Stage Estimates
Note: The blue line indicates the OLS regression of the cumulative number of refugee arrivals per island resident on the logged distance to
the Turkish coast. The red line shows the analogous scatterplot smoother. The size of the dots is proportional to the number of survey
respondents.
TABLE 1. Placebo Outcomes
GD S/A ND PASOK Female Age Education
Treatment 0.00 20.06 0.04 0.02 20.03 20.01 20.03
(0.008) (0.029) (0.024) (0.013) (0.030) (0.032) (0.024)
Constant 0.02*** 0.39*** 0.21*** 0.07*** 0.57*** 0.50*** 0.47***
(0.006) (0.021) (0.020) (0.010) (0.021) (0.024) (0.020)
N 2,046 2,046 2,046 2,046 2,046 2,046 2,046
Note: 2SLS regressionestimates (with cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses) of placebooutcomesof refugee arrivals, instrumented
with the island’s distance to the Turkish coast. Outcomes are vote choice for: Golden Dawn (GD), SYRIZA/ANEL (S/A), Nea Dimokratia
(ND), andPASOK in the January 2015election; demographic indicators for female, older thanmedianageof 50, and tertiary education.
* p , 0.05; ** p , 0.01; *** p , 0.001.
7 The survey was ﬁelded by the Survey Unit of the University of
Macedonia according to our sampling frame and in linewith the ethics
policy of the London School of Economics and Political Science for
human subjects research.
Does Exposure to the Refugee Crisis Make Natives More Hostile?
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all household members (Salmon and Nichols 1983). The
cumulative response rate (RR3) as deﬁned by the
American Association for Public Opinion Research is
8%, which is about the same as the response rate for
CATI interviews in the USA (Keeter et al. 2017). One
potential concern is that thewillingness tobe interviewed
is correlated with distance to the Turkish coast, which
might confound the analysis. However, this is not the
case: the probability of being interviewed is very similar
for residents living close and farther away from the
Turkish coast, and Welch’s t-test cannot reject the null
hypothesis of no difference at conventional levels (p .
0.094, two-tailed).
Themainanalysisusingall adult respondentspresented
below uses survey weights that are proportional to the
population size of the island under the constraint that the
respondents of treated and control islands receive half of
the aggregate weight each. Item nonresponse was gen-
erally low (on average 4.9% across all measures) but in
order to remove any imbalances and increase the efﬁ-
ciency of our estimates, we use multiple imputation to
address missing answers. The robustness section below
shows that all results also hold with alternative weighting
strategies, without weighting, and list-wise deletion.
Furtherdetailson thesampling frame, surveyweights,and
multiple imputation are provided inAppendix SectionA.
Outcome Measures
For the outcomes, we employ standard indicators for
attitudes toward outgroup minorities, policy prefer-
ences concerning refugee and voluntary migration, and
quasi-behavioralmeasures of political engagement.We
use a series of feeling thermometer questions about
various outgroups (relative to the majority group) as
explicit measures of racial attitudes. Past research has
shown that they are highly correlated with behavioral
measures of discrimination (McConnell and Leibold
2001). The additional attitudinal questions are largely
based on the Global Attitudes Survey (Wike, Stokes,
and Simmons 2016), but answers are recorded on a ﬁve-
point scale to decrease acquiescence response bias
(Revilla, Saris, and Krosnick 2014). The questions
eliciting policy preferences are adapted from Bansak,
Hainmueller, and Hangartner (2017) and tailored
toward the Greek case. Lastly, the quasi-behavioral
outcomes attach real-life consequences to the
respondents’ answers to questions about political
preferences and engagement in the refugee context
(Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008).
Theﬁrst setofoutcomesmeasuresanti-asylumseeker
policy preferences and attitudes.Weasked respondents
whether they agreed that refugee children should be
banned from schools (from 1 to 5), an issue that was
hotly debated at the time of the survey; that Greece
should decrease the number of people towhom it grants
asylum (1–5); and that asylum seekers aremore likely to
commit terrorist attacks (1–5) and crimes (1–5) and are
a burden on the country (1–5).
The second set of outcomes measures more general
anti-immigrant policy preferences and attitudes. We
asked respondents if they support a decrease in the
numberof economicmigrants (from1 to 5) and stronger
border protection (1–5). We also measured the differ-
ence in their feeling thermometer scores (0–100)
between Greek Muslims and Muslim immigrants, and
Greek Christians and Christian immigrants.
The third set of outcomes provides quasi-behavioral
measures of respondents’ willingness to politically
engage to change asylum policies and donate to support
refugees. We asked respondents whether we should
notify their Member of Parliament (MP) on their behalf
that they support a decrease (or increase) of the number
of people to whom Greece grants asylum (from 1 to 5);
whether (0/1) and how much (0–100) they wanted to
donate to UNHCR if they won the EUR 100 rafﬂe that
was part of the survey; and whether they would like to
sign an existing petition that lobbies the government to
provide better housing for refugees (0/1).
The fourth set of outcomes measures general anti-
Muslim policy preferences and attitudes. We asked
respondents whether they believed that the political
representation of the Greek Muslim minority in the
Greek parliament should be reduced, remain the same,
or be increased (1–5). We also measured the difference
in their feeling thermometer scores (0–100) between
Christian immigrants andMuslim immigrants andasked
whether they believe that most Muslims are not willing
to integrate (1–5) and are likely to support extremist
groups (1–5).8 The question wording and outcome
coding are reported in Appendix Section A.3 and A.4.
Lastly, for eachof the four sets of outcomes,webuilt a
summary scale that combines the different measures by
extracting the ﬁrst component of a polychoric principal
component analysis (PCA) (Olsson 1979). Appendix
SectionA.3 provides details on the PCAand shows that
for each scale, theﬁrst component explains a large share
of the total variance. Averaging responses across
multiple items measuring the same latent construct not
only reduces bias and variance from random meas-
urement error that is common in survey research
(Hainmueller,Hangartner, andPietrantuono2017),but
also alleviates worries about false-positive signiﬁcance
tests by focusing the analysis on a few main outcomes.
Treatment and Instrument
To measure refugee arrival, our treatment variable, we
use island-level registry data collected by UNHCR
(2016). Figure 3 shows the strong clustering of arrivals
on islands close to the Turkish coast. We code a binary
indicator equal to one if UNHCR recorded a positive
number of arrivals and 0 otherwise. As robustness tests,
we also code two continuous measures based on the
cumulative number of arrivals between January 2015
and March 2016 as a fraction of the number of island
residents and the log (11) of this ratio, respectively.
8 We also included a battery of questions that measure general atti-
tudes toward outgroups with questions such as: “For being truly
Greek, it is important to (i) havebeenborn inGreece; (ii) beingable to
speak Greek; (iii) being Christian Orthodox.” We do not ﬁnd any
effect of refugee arrivals on these outcomes. The results are shown in
Appendix Section D.
Dominik Hangartner et al.
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Our instrument is the logarithm of the shortest path
(henceforth distance) between Turkish coast and the
population center of amunicipality (typically an island),
which we calculate using Google Maps. This distance
measurecorrelateshighly (r50.997)withanalternative
distance measure based on the polygon’s centroid of a
municipality in Greece and the closest point to the
Turkish polygon in GIS software.
Statistical Analysis
To estimate the effect of exposure to the refugee crisis,
weﬁt two-stage least squares (2SLS)models inwhichwe
regress the outcome on our binary exposure indicator
controlling for respondent demographic characteristics.
We instrument the exposure dummy with a continuous
instrument as described above. For all analyses, we
cluster standard errors by municipality, of which there
are 92 in ourmain speciﬁcation. The standard errors are
virtually identical if we cluster at the island level (see
Appendix Figure E7).
The sampling frame, questionnaire, coding rules for
covariates and outcomes (including the summary scales
extracted from the PCA), and statistical analyses were
all prespeciﬁed in a pre-analysis plan posted to the
Political Science Registered Studies Dataverse before
we conducted the survey and can be retrieved at doi:
10.7910/DVN/FFEUEH.
RESULTS
In Figure 4, we present the effect estimates for the
instrumented treatment. Tables D4–D9 in Appendix
report the full regression tables. The black estimates
show the impact of exposure to the refugee crisis on
the ﬁrst principal components for each summary
measure. Exploiting exogenous variation in refugee
arrivals, we ﬁnd that respondents on directly exposed
islands experience an increase of about 0.24 SD in
their hostility toward asylum seekers (p, 0.001, two-
tailed), 0.23 SD in their hostility toward immigrants (p
5 0.001), and 0.13 SD in their hostility toward Mus-
lims (p 5 0.041). Finally, we ﬁnd that immediate
exposure has a strong impact on our summary
measure of the quasi-behavioral outcomes and
increases anti-refugee political engagement by 0.33
SD (p , 0.001).
FIGURE 3. Map of the Aegean Sea
Does Exposure to the Refugee Crisis Make Natives More Hostile?
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Looking at the outcomes separately, we see consistent
changes in policy preferences (blue estimates) and atti-
tudes (greenestimates) and that the formerare generally
larger. With regard to anti-asylum seeker preferences,
we ﬁnd that respondents on exposed islands are more
likely to support banning refugee children from schools
(point estimate: 0.41units onaﬁvepoint scale,p, 0.001)
and decreasing the number of people to whom Greece
grants asylum(0.26,p, 0.001). Thesepolicy preferences
are particularly remarkable because refugees only
passed through the islands and were not sending their
children toAegeanschools.Wealsoﬁndthatexposure to
the refugee crisis leads to an increase in anti-asylum
seeker attitudes: exposed respondents believe that asy-
lum seekers are more likely to commit terrorist attacks
(0.25, p5 0.002) and crimes (0.14, p5 0.102) and are a
burden on Greece (0.12, p 5 0.097).
With regard to general anti-immigrant policy prefer-
ences,weﬁndthat respondentsonexposed islandsprefer
fewer economic migrants (0.24, p, 0.001) and stronger
border protection (0.08, p 5 0.0126). Turning to the
feeling thermometer scores, we see that exposed
respondents prefer Greek Muslims over Muslim immi-
grants (0.09, p 5 0.015) but ﬁnd no effect on the dif-
ference between Christian Greek natives and Christian
immigrants (20.002, p 5 0.956).
Looking at anti-Muslim policy preferences, we ﬁnd
that exposure to the refugee crisis signiﬁcantly weakens
support for the political representation of the Muslim
minority in theGreek parliament (0.10, p5 0.043). This
effect on domestic policy is remarkable as Greece has
had a sizable Muslim minority since the Ottoman
Empire, and the issue of adequate parliamentary rep-
resentation of Greek Muslims is unrelated to the
FIGURE 4. 2SLS Regression Estimates of the Impact of Refugee Arrivals
Note: 2SLS regression estimates (with 95% conﬁdence intervals based on cluster-robust standard errors) of the impact of refugee arrivals,
instrumented with the island’ s distance to the Turkish coast, on respondents’ attitudes (green), policy preferences (blue), and PCA-based
summary measure (black).
Dominik Hangartner et al.
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refugee issue. While respondents on arrival islands
more strongly prefer Christian overMuslim immigrants
(0.12, p 5 0.014), we do not ﬁnd any differences in
respondents’ beliefs about the willingness of Muslims
living inGreece toadoptGreek culture (0.12, p50.081)
or support extremist groups (0.09, p 5 0.271).
Turning to the quasi-behavioral outcomes, we ﬁnd
that exposure to the refugee crisis increases political
engagement in support of more restrictive asylum
policies. Conﬁrming the results based on stated pref-
erences discussed above, residents on exposed islands
aremore likely to lobby theirMP to grant fewer asylum
requests (0.24 unit increase on ﬁve point scale, p ,
0.001). They are also 14 percentage points less likely to
donate to the UNHCR (p , 0.001) and donate on
averageEUR11 less (p, 0.001). Lastly, these residents
are 7 percentage points less likely to sign a petition that
lobbies the national Greek government to provide
better accommodation for asylum seekers (p 5 0.005).
Most of these effects are not only statistically signiﬁcant
but also politically important. To benchmark the results,
we can compare the effect size for the outcome that
measures support for decreasing the number of granted
asylum requests to a recently conducted survey covering
ﬁfteen European countries (Bansak, Hainmueller, and
Hangartner 2016) that asked the same question.
Appendix Figure D1 shows that the 0.26 unit increase
resulting fromdirectexposure to the refugeecrisis is about
equivalent to moving from the second most liberal
(Norway) to the second most restrictive country (Hun-
gary) of the ﬁfteen surveyed countries.
Robustness
One concern is that there might be unobserved charac-
teristics thatdifferbetween islandscloserandfartheraway
from the Turkish coast that are also correlated with
preferences over asylumpolicies, thereby invalidating the
ignorability assumption for our instrument.We conduct a
series of tests to show that this concern is unwarranted.
First, we control for respondents’ vote choice in the
last election prior to the refugee crisis in January 2015.
With thepresenceof theﬁercely anti-immigrantGolden
Dawn, we can expect that support for different parties is
correlated with anti-immigrant and refugee attitudes
and therefore a good proxy for preexisting differences
among islands that are closer and farther away from
Turkey. Figure E2 inAppendix shows that this concern
is unfounded. Adding binary indicators for voting for
one of the parties running for ofﬁce (plus abstention) as
covariates has little effect on our estimates. These null
effects further corroborate the validity of the exclusion
restriction discussed in the previous section. Alter-
natively, we can also use municipal-level vote shares
from the January 2015 election to adjust for preexisting
differences in political preferences. Appendix Figure
E3 shows that all results remain unchanged.
As a second check, we constrain the sample to islands
that are relatively close to the Turkish border. If there is
anunobserved confounder correlatedwith distance, the
effect estimates for the subsample of islands within a
255-kilometer (the midpoint of our distance variable)
perimeter of Turkey should be different from the
estimates from the full sample. Figure E4 in Appendix
shows that this is not the case and that the subsample
estimates are very similar.
Third, we re-estimate all IV regressions but use the
continuous measures of refugee arrivals per island
residents instead of the binary indicator. Figure E5 in
Appendix shows the results, which follow the same
pattern that we have observed for the binary arrival
indicator. This ﬁnding not only conﬁrms the robustness
of our main results, but also reveals that the intensity of
arrivals, i.e., the intensive margin, matters. While the
binary estimates show that the arrival of refugees
triggers hostile reactions among natives, the continuous
treatment estimates indicate that their relative number
also matters: for 10 additional refugee arrivals per
resident, the anti-refugee, anti-immigrant, and anti-
Muslim preferences increase by 0.31 SD (p , 0.001),
0.29 SD (p , 0.001), and 0.17 SD (p 5 0.008), respec-
tively. The results for log arrivals are very similar, in
terms of both effect size and signiﬁcance.
Lastly, in order to gauge the impact of the weighting
and multiple imputation procedure on the results, we
estimate ourmain regression with weights proportional
to the number of voters of the island (independent of
treatment status); with weights provided by the survey
company balancing the sample by gender, age, and
population density; with equal weights per respondent;
andwith andwithoutmultiple imputation.AsFigureE6
inAppendix shows, all estimates remain robust to those
alternative speciﬁcations.
Mechanisms
This section explores different mechanisms that predict
when, and for whom, exposure to the refugee crisis
triggers exclusionary reactions. First, we consider
whether respondentswho receive their incomeprimarily
from tourism reactmore strongly to refugee arrivals, due
to material concerns about the impact on their revenue.
To test for thismechanism,wereplicate themainanalysis
but subset the sample to respondents whose income
stems exclusively, partially, or not at all from tourism.
FigureE11 inAppendix shows the results.While there is
some heterogeneity in treatment effects for respondents
depending on their main source of income, there is no
consistent pattern and most of these differences are not
statistically signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding further supports the
argument that not egocentric economic concerns, but
rather the chaotic management of the refugee crisis,
triggered hostility among the local population.
Second, we test whether the impact of the refugee
crisis is strongest in the vicinity of the hotspots, where
perceived threat arguably reached its highest levels. To
answer this question, we leverage a complementary
empirical strategy that focuses on islands that registered
arrivals and exploit the within-island variation of the
distance between respondents’ township and the closest
refugee hotspot. As hotspots, we code (UNHCR) ref-
ugee camps and the ports from which refugees con-
tinued their journeys via ferries to Athens and beyond.
Figure 5 shows a map of these hotspots.
Does Exposure to the Refugee Crisis Make Natives More Hostile?
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Figure 6 presents the results from the within-island
analysis. We run a series of OLS regressions with ﬁxed
effects for each municipality, where we use the same
outcomes but respondents’ distance to the hotspot as
the treatment variable. We specify three different
functions for the treatment: a binary indicator for living
within a 10-kilometer radius of a hotspot, a continuous
measure of distance in kilometers, and logged distance.
Despite the difference in the empirical strategy and the
focus on highly local variation in exposure to the refugee
crisis, where spillover effects on island residents slightly
fartherawayare likely, theﬁndingsareremarkablysimilar
to our main estimates identiﬁed from between-island
variation. Proximity to refugee hotspots signiﬁcantly
and substantially increases respondents’ hostility toward
asylum seekers and economic immigrants and also
increases their support for exclusionary policies. This
pattern is consistentwith the idea that the highly localized
andspatiallyconcentratedchaos surroundingthehotspots
created a feeling of threat and triggered exclusionary
reactions among natives.
A third mechanism relevant for our theoretical under-
standingof thedriversofanti-immigrantattitudesconcerns
“galvanization effects” (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and
Prior 2004), i.e., the idea that situational triggers dis-
proportionally affect the reactions of those who are
already predisposed to feeling threatened. If so, we
would expect that those with the highest level of pre-
existing anti-immigrant preferences are most strongly
affected by the perceived threat induced by the refugee
crisis (Hetherington andWeiler 2009).Alternatively, we
might believe that instead of further hardening the
attitudes of already hostile citizens, threat might induce
citizens with relatively positive attitudes toward out-
groups and, absent the crisis, low levels of threat,
becoming more hostile (Stenner 2005).
In order to discriminate between these two com-
peting hypotheses, we run a series of quantile instru-
mental variable regressions (Chernozhukov and
Hansen 2005), which enable us to estimate the treat-
ment effect at different deciles of the outcome dis-
tribution. Figure E10 in Appendix presents the effect
estimates for the four principal components. The gen-
eral pattern is that the treatment effects are fairly
constant across the different deciles,meaning that those
with less exclusionary attitudes react similarly negative
FIGURE 5. Location of Hotspots Based on Data From the UNHCR
Dominik Hangartner et al.
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to the refugee crisis as those with already strong
exclusionary attitudes. While some of the estimates are
slightly larger for respondents with more hostile views,
these differences are not always statistically signiﬁcant.
We also perform an additional test that splits the
sample into voters who supported either right-wing
(New Democracy) or extreme-right (Golden Dawn)
parties versus not voting for one of these two parties in
January 2015, the last pretreatment election. If the
impact of the crisis ampliﬁes partisan differences, we
would expect that the effect ismore pronounced among
right-wing or extreme-right voters (Gravelle 2016,
2018). If, however, exposuremutes partisandifferences,
we would expect larger effects among voters for leftist
and centrist parties (Branton et al. 2007).9 Figure E8 in
Appendix shows again that the effects are fairly similar
between right-wing/extreme-right and centrist/leftist
voters. A Welch’s t-test indicates that for all four
components, the differences between the subgroups are
not statistically signiﬁcant (p 5 0.270, p 5 0.261, p 5
0.639, p 5 0.981). Together, the two analyses seem to
provide little evidence for either hypothesis, suggesting
instead that the exposure effects spread quite uniformly
across the ideological spectrum.
CONCLUSION
This study exploits a natural experiment in the Aegean
Sea to examine the impact of the refugee crisis on the
attitudes,policypreferences,andpolitical engagementof
natives. Using distance to the Turkish coast as an
instrument for exposure to the refugee crisis,weﬁnd that
residents of islands that experience large and sudden
inﬂuxes of refugees becomemore hostile toward asylum
seekers, immigrants, andMuslims, and aremore likely to
support and lobby for more restrictive asylum policies
than natives in similar islands that receive fewer or no
asylumseekers.Substituting thebinarywithacontinuous
arrival measure, we ﬁnd that exposure to the refugee
crisis impacts attitudes at both extensive and intensive
margins, i.e., that natives’ hostility to refugee and
immigrant outgroups grows proportionally to the num-
ber of arrivals. These ﬁndings are further supported by
FIGURE 6. Within-Island OLS Estimates (with 95% Conﬁdence Intervals Based on Cluster-Robust
Standard Errors) of the Effect of Distance to the Hotspot on Natives’ Attitudes
Note: Theﬁrstmodelusesabinary indicatorequal toone if the respondent lives less than10kilometer fromahotspot, thesecondmodelusesa
continuousmeasure of distance in kilometers and the third model the log of continuousmeasure. Estimates are based on imputed data and
weighted by the number of voters and the municipality’s treatment status. Standard errors are clustered by township (Ncluster 5 125).
9 This test was suggested by an anonymous reviewer and was not
speciﬁed in the pre-analysis plan. The complement to voting for the
New Democracy or Golden Dawn is voting for SYRIZA, ANEL,
PASOK, KKE, ANTARSYA, The River, Democrats’ and Socialists’
Movement,EK, any other party not listed in the survey questionnaire,
and people who did not vote.
Does Exposure to the Refugee Crisis Make Natives More Hostile?
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complementarywithin-island analyses, which reveal that
most of the political backlash against refugee arrivals is
spatially concentrated. These effects are large enough to
be politically signiﬁcant. For example,with respect to the
questionofwhether the government shoulddecrease the
number of people to whom it grants asylum, the differ-
ences in opinion amongGreek residents on exposed and
nonexposed islands are as big as the differences in
opinionamongcitizensof very restrictiveandvery liberal
countries in Europe.
While themassive refugee arrival onGreek islands is
an extreme case, people in many places have been
exposed to past and ongoing refugee crises in similar
ways. Since refugees, unlike othermigrants, rarely have
the ability to travel by plane, they typically pass through
several countries until they reach their destination. For
example, in the context of the current refugee crisis,
millions of citizens from transit countries observed
Afghan and Syrian refugees traveling to Western
Europevia Jordan,LebanonandTurkey toGreece, and
from there along theBalkan route via FYRMacedonia,
Bosnia andCroatia or Serbia andHungary toAustria.10
Natives living along this route have experienced the
transit of refugees and how it disturbed everyday life in
very similar ways as the residents of theAegean islands.
We therefore expect that our ﬁndings from Greece
would also apply to theseEuropean countries, aswell as
several Northern African transit countries.
We believe that our ﬁndings have important impli-
cations forour theoretical understandingof thedriversof
anti-refugee and anti-immigrant preferences. First, our
study shows that in cases in which refugee arrivals are
massive but also transient, they spark natives’ hostility
acrossawiderangeofoutcomes.Refugees left thearrival
islands typicallywithin24hours,which severely limits the
potential formeaningful interactionbetweennatives and
refugees. In Allport’s (1954) words, the best we could
hopefor in thepresentcontext is“casualcontact,”butnot
“acquaintance.” Hence, we would not expect that con-
ditions for the contacthypothesis to alleviatehostility are
met here (Pettigrew 1998). For the same reason, how-
ever, we also do not expect that standard theories of
economic or cultural concerns would apply (e.g., Golder
2003; Scheve, andSlaughter 2001), since refugeesdid not
stay long enough on arrival islands to threaten the
economic, political, or cultural prerogatives of the native
population (Blalock 1967).
Even if the transient refugee arrivals did not threaten
prerogatives of the local population, they did disrupt
their lives. The inability of the local and European
authorities to effectively manage the refugee ﬂows and
provide medical support and sanitary services caused
chaotic scenes at the hotspots and sparked concerns
about the spread of diseases. Our ﬁndings of a uniform
effect of exposure to the refugee crisis across the sample
suggest that this threat triggered exclusionary reactions
not only among those already predisposed against
immigration, but also among respondents who
otherwisewould exhibit inclusionary attitudes andhave
not voted for (extreme) right-wing parties in the past.
Second, the fact that almost twelve months elapsed
between the passing of the last refugee in March 2016
and the ﬁelding of our survey in 2017 suggests that the
exclusionary reactions documented here are not short-
lived or an exacerbated reaction to a contemporaneous
trigger, but rather entrenched and persistent. Hence,
this ﬁnding is difﬁcult to reconcile with the idea that
repeated exposure to an outgroup alone, i.e., without
meaningful contact, is sufﬁcient to mitigate initial
negative reactions (Enos 2014).
Third, we ﬁnd that exposure to large numbers of
asylum seekers causes natives to become more hostile
not only toward refugees, but also toward economic
migrants and Muslims, including native Muslims who
have been residing in Greece for centuries. In times of
enduringly high levels of refugee migration, this ﬁnding
of ahostile spillovereffect fromoneoutgroup toanother,
unrelated minority is concerning from a normative
perspectiveandan important avenue for future research.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
To view supplementary material for this article, please
visit https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000813.
Replication materials can be found on Dataverse at:
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/XGVQDT.
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